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News / Recent Events
- 16.-18.03.09, Second ACM Conference on Wireless Network Security (WiSec'09)
- 26.09.08, The System Security Group presented its research to the public at the Researchers' Night in Zurich on Friday, September 26th.
- 15.04.08, ETH press release on our iPhone/iPod localization attack project, more technical details here.
- 22.11.07, ETH Globe on our Secure Localization Research
- 27./28.09. 2007, ZISC Workshop on Wireless Security
- 16.05.07, Neue Zürcher Zeitung on our Secure Localization Research
Below is a list of some recent activities in the group. For a full list of publications or project descriptions use the menu on the left.
PROXIMITY-BASED ACCESS CONTROL FOR IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICESWe propose a proximity-based access control scheme for implantable medical devices (IMDs). Our scheme is based on ultrasonic distance bounding and enables an implanted medical device to grant access to its resources only to those devices that are in its close proximity. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach through tests in an emulated patient environment. We show that, although implanted, IMDs can successfully verify the proximity of other devices with high accuracy. We propose a set of protocols that support our scheme, analyze their security in detail and discuss possible extensions. We make new observations about the security of implementations of ultrasonic distance-bounding protocols. Finally, we discuss the integration of our scheme with existing IMD devices and with their existing security measures. People:Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Claude Castelluccia, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin, Srdjan Capkun Publication:Proximity-based Access Control for Implantable Medical Devices, In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2009 [PDF | bibtex] |
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LOCATION PRIVACY OF DISTANCE BOUNDING PROTOCOLSWe analyze, in a number of scenarios, how much information distance bounding protocols leak. We further discuss several straightforward countermeasures and show why they do not provide adequate protection against distance leakage. Finally, we propose a location private distance bounding protocol that maintains the properties of existing distance bounding protocols while leaking no information about the distance measured between the communicating parties. Read more on the project web page. People:Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Srdjan Capkun Publication:Location Privacy of Distance Bounding Protocols |
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UNCOORDINATED FREQUENCY HOPPINGWe
consider the problem of how two devices that do not share any secrets
can establish a shared secret key over a wireless radio channel in the
presence of a communication jammer, i.e., in the absence of a reliable
communication channel. As a solution, we propose an Uncoordinated
Frequency Hopping (UFH) scheme that breaks the dependency on a shared
secret key and enables key establishment in the presence of a
communication jammer. Read more on the project web page. People:Mario Strasser, Christina Pöpper, Srdjan Capkun, Mario Cagalj Publications:Efficient Uncoordinated FHSS Anti-Jamming Communication, Jamming-resistant Key Establishment using Uncoordinated Frequency Hopping, |
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DEMONSTRATION OF LOCATION SPOOFINGWe analysed conventional public WLAN-based localization systems such as the WPS of Skyhook, which is being used in Apple's iPhone and iPod touch devices. By using a combination of access point spoofing and jamming, we were able to displace the location returned by these devices to an arbitrary position. Read more on the project web page. People:Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Christina Pöpper, Srdjan Capkun Publication:Attacks on Public WLAN-based Positioning |
UWB-BASED SECURE RANGING AND LOCALIZATIONWe propose and implement a novel ID-based secure ranging protocol. Our
protocol is inspired by existing authenticated ranging and
distance-bounding protocols, and is tailored to work on existing Ultra
Wide Band (UWB) ranging platforms. Building on the implementation of
secure ranging, we further implement a secure localization protocol
that enables the computation of a correct device location in the
presence of an adversary. We study how various implementations of
secure ranging and localization protocols impacts their security and
performance. Read more on the project web page. People:Nils Ole Tippenhauer, Srdjan Capkun Publication:UWB-based Secure Ranging and Localization,Technical Report 586, ETH Zürich, System Security Group, January 2008. Submitted for Publication. [PDF] |
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