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Security of Medical Devices
News / Recent Events
- 23.12.2011 Christina Pöpper is interviewed for WRS regarding the recent U.S. drone captured in Iran and the GPS spoofing claims.
- 21.10.2011 Ghassan Karame presents the paper "Privacy-Preserving Outsourcing of Brute-Force Key Searches" at CCSW in Chicago, IL.
- 18.10.2011 Nils Ole Tippenhauer presents the paper "On the Requirements for Successful GPS Spoofing Attacks" at CCS in Chicago, IL.
- 15.9.2011 Srdjan Capkun gives a keynote at TrustED on "On Physical-Layer Identification of RFID Tags" in Leuven, Belgium.
- 12.9.2011 Christina Pöpper presents the paper "Investigation of Signal and Message Manipulations on the Wireless Channel" at ESORICS in Leuven, Belgium.
- 27.7.2011 Davide Zanetti presents the paper "On The Practicality of UHF RFID Fingerprinting: How Real is the RFID Tracking Problem?" in PETS in Waterloo, Canada
- 7.7.2011 Prof. Srdjan Capkun is now an Associate Professor at ETH
This project deals with the security of medical devices (e.g., pacemakers). We investigate the security and privacy threats against these devices and research ways to detect, prevent, and counteract attacks that aim at compromising these devices.
We made the following proposals for securing medical devices; further information and related publications are given below:
| TITLE | CONTENT |
| PROXIMITY-BASED ACCESS CONTROL FOR IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES | We propose a proximity-based access control scheme for implantable medical devices (IMDs). |
Syssec members on the project: Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Thomas Heydt-Benjamin, Srdjan Capkun
PROXIMITY-BASED ACCESS CONTROL FOR IMPLANTABLE MEDICAL DEVICES
| We propose a proximity-based access control scheme for implantable medical devices (IMDs). Our scheme is based on ultrasonic distance bounding and enables an implanted medical device to grant access to its resources only to those devices that are in its close proximity. We demonstrate the feasibility of our approach through tests in an emulated patient environment. We show that, although implanted, IMDs can successfully verify the proximity of other devices with high accuracy. We propose a set of protocols that support our scheme, analyze their security in detail and discuss possible extensions. We make new observations about the security of implementations of ultrasonic distance-bounding protocols. Finally, we discuss the integration of our scheme with existing IMD devices and with their existing security measures. |
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Related publication:
- Kasper Bonne Rasmussen, Claude Castelluccia, Thomas S. Heydt-Benjamin and Srdjan Capkun
Proximity-based Access Control for Implantable Medical Devices
In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS), 2009 [PDF | bibtex]
Other project publications:
- Daniel Bodmer, Srdjan Capkun
On the Security and Privacy in Cochlear Implants
ETH Zurich, D-INFK, Technical Report No. 677, 2010 [PDF]
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