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Secure Deletion
News / Recent Events
- 4.5.2012 Joel Reardon presents the paper "User-level Secure Deletion on Log-structured File Systems" at ASIACCS in Seoul, Korea.
- 16.4.2012 Aanjhan Ranganathan presents the paper "Physical-Layer Attacks on Chirp-based Ranging Systems" at WiSec in Tucson, Arizona.
- 2.4.2012 Nils Ole Tippenhauer is interviewed for students.ch regarding the risk of cyber attacks.
- 23.12.2011 Christina Pöpper is interviewed for WRS regarding the recent U.S. drone captured in Iran and the GPS spoofing claims.
- 8.12.2011 Boris Danev presents the paper "Enabling Secure VM-vTPM Migration in Private Clouds" at ACSAC in Orlando, Florida.
- 21.10.2011 Ghassan Karame presents the paper "Privacy-Preserving Outsourcing of Brute-Force Key Searches" at CCSW in Chicago, IL.
- 18.10.2011 Nils Ole Tippenhauer presents the paper "On the Requirements for Successful GPS Spoofing Attacks" at CCS in Chicago, IL.
In this project, we analyze solutions to the secure deletion problem. In particular we provide methods to securely delete data from modern devices working at different levels (user-space, files system, flash translation layer, ...)
We made the following proposals in regards of the secure deletion topic; further information and related publications are given below:
| TITLE | CONTENT |
| SECURE DELETION ON LOG-STRUCTURED FILE SYSTEMS | We propose three mechanisms to address the problem of Secure Deletion on log-structured file systems such as YAFFS. |
Members of the project: Joel Reardon, Claudio Marforio, Srdjan Capkun, David Basin
SECURE DELETION ON LOG-STRUCTURED FILE SYSTEMS
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We address the problem of secure data deletion on log- structured file systems. We focus on the YAFFS file sys- tem, widely used on Android smartphones. We show that these systems provide no temporal guarantees on data dele- tion and that deleted data still persists for nearly 44 hours with average phone use and indefinitely if the phone is not used after the deletion. Furthermore, we show that file over- writing and encryption, methods commonly used for secure deletion on block-structured file systems, do not ensure data deletion in log-structured file systems. We propose three mechanisms for secure deletion on log- structured file systems. Purging is a user-level mechanism that guarantees secure deletion at the cost of negligible de- vice wear. Ballooning is a user-level mechanism that runs continuously and gives probabilistic improvements to se- cure deletion. Zero overwriting is a kernel-level mecha- nism that guarantees immediate secure deletion without de- vice wear. We implement these mechanisms on Nexus One smartphones and show that they succeed in secure deletion and neither prohibitively reduce the longevity of the flash memory nor noticeably reduce the device’s battery lifetime. These techniques provide mobile phone users more confi- dence that data they delete from their phones are indeed deleted. |
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Related technical report:
Joel Reardon, Claudio Marforio, Srdjan Capkun, David Basin
Secure Deletion on Log-structured File Systems
arXiv:1106.0917v1 [arXiv | PDF]
Secure deletion application (Android):
www.securedeletion.com
Secure Deletion in the News:
Schweizer Fernsehen Einstein show: 9.6.2011
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